Whereas a block cipher enciphers messages of some one particular length the blocklength, a variable-input-length cipher takes messages of varying and preferably arbitrary lengths. Still, the length of the ciphertext must equal the length of the plaintext. This paper introduces the problem of constructing such objects, and provides a practical solution. Our VIL mode of operation make s a v ariable-input-length cipher from any block cipher. The method is demonstrably secure in the provable-security sense of modern cryptography: we give a quantitative security analysis relating the di culty of breaking the constructed variable-input-length cipher to the di culty of breaking the underlying block cipher.
Introduction
This paper introduces the question of how to construct ciphers which operate on messages of varying lengths. Such a cipher, F, maps a key K and a plaintext M in f0; 1g or M in some other set containing strings of various lengths into a ciphertext C = F K M h a ving the same length as M. Note that the length of M is not restricted to some xed blocklength n, o r e v en to some multiple of a blocklength. At the same time, being a cipher, F K is a length-preserving permutation for which possession of K enables the e cient computation of both F K and F ,1 K . The ciphers we construct have a strong security property: we w ant that no e cient adversary can distinguish an oracle for F K , for a random and secret K, from an oracle for a random length-preserving permutation having the same domain as F K . This is the now customary requirement for a block cipher security in the sense of being a pseudorandom permutation," or PRP" originally suggested in 10, 4 , and so it is the property we want for any variable-inputlength cipher as well.
One could try to construct a variable-input-length cipher from scratch, in the confusion di usion tradition. But that approach is specialized and error-prone. Instead, we provide constructions which assume one already has in hand some underlying block cipher. We give a mode of operation"| VIL mode for variable-input-length enciphering" which enciphers strings of arbitrary length but at least n using an n-bit block cipher.
We prove the soundness of VIL mode in the provable-security sense of modern cryptography: if the underlying block cipher is secure then so is the variable-input-length cipher we construct from it. VIL is actually more than one particular mode of operation; it is an approach for making a variable-input-length cipher that can be realized in many di erent w a ys. Why variable-input-length ciphers? The obvious use of variable-input-length ciphers is to encrypt ie, provide privacy protection without any increase in message length. Suppose we'll be encrypting messages M 1 ; M 2 ; where the lengths of these message may v ary. We want to create ciphertexts C 1 ; C 2 ; where jC i j = jM i j and where ciphertext C i hides everything about M i with respect to e cient computation except for the length of M i and which earlier plaintext, if any, equals M i .
It is important to understand that the last sentence embodies a weaker notion of privacy than the customary one|semantic security, and its equivalent formulations 7, 3 . A semantically secure encryption computationally hides all information about M i except for jM i j|in particular, one does not allow to be leaked which earlier plaintext if any a given ciphertext corresponds to. But you pay a price for this added security|semantically secure encryption cannot possibly be length preserving. Thus length-preserving encryption" enciphering embodies a tradeo : shorter ciphertexts at the cost of an inferior security guarantee and slower encryption decryption.
Is this tradeo a good one? If you don't know a n ything about how the encryption will be used, then we'd have t o s a y no. But there are applications when the tradeo is a good one. Let us give an example.
In networking applications a packet format" may h a v e been de ned, this packet format having various elds, none of which w ere intended for cryptographic purposes. Now suppose a need arises to add in privacy features but, at the same time, it is no longer desirable or feasible to adjust the packet format. It cannot be lengthened by e v en one bit. Enciphering with a variable-input-length cipher leaves the packet size alone, and it leaves packets looking identical after deciphering to the way they looked before. This contributes to ease-of-acceptance, an easier migration path, and better code-reuse. These factors may outweigh the security consideration that we will be leaking which packets of a session are identical to which earlier ones.
As a second example, we m a y h a v e a priori reason to believe that all the plaintexts M 1 ; M 2 ; will be distinct. For example, each message may b e k n o wn to contain a sequence number. In such a case the additional piece of information that secure encipherment leaks amounts to no information at all, and so here enciphering provides a way to achieve semantic security in a way that is both length-minimal and oblivious to the formatting conventions of each message eg, where the sequence number appears in each message. This obliviousness contributes to the making of robust software; when message formats change the cryptography need not be adjusted. With typical length-minimal approaches this would not have been true.
Variable-input-length ciphers may prove to be useful tools for protocol design. As an example, Rivest put forward the idea of strongly non-separable encryption" 23 , wherein an adversary with a ciphertext C who guesses an encryption key K should have t o i n v est jCj time before obtaining information useful to verify if C was enciphered under K. Variable-input-length enciphering provides a simple way to provably achieve Rivest's goal. The difficulty. It is not so clear how to construct a secure variable-input-length cipher from a block cipher. We are making a stringent security requirement: we expect our ciphers to approximate a family of random permutations. In addition, we w ant them to be length-preserving permutations. This eliminates any hope of using conventional modes of operation. Consider, for example, using DES in CBC mode with a zero initialization vector IV. For simplicity, assume the message length i s a m ultiple of the blocklength. 1 This does not give a cipher that approximates a family of random permutation: if two plaintexts agree on blocks 1; : : : ; i then their ciphertexts agree on blocks 1; : : : ; i , which is almost never true of a random permutation. To get around this one might try to make the IV some sort of hash of the message|but then how could one get a length-preserving construction? Our method. We suggest simple and e cient w a ys for making variable-input-length ciphers from block ciphers. Our VIL mode of operation makes two passes over the message. In our preferred instantiation, the rst pass computes some sort of CBC MAC o v er the message M, while the second pass encrypts M in counter mode, for example using the pass-one MAC as the IV. However, one cannot take the ciphertext C for M to bethe pass-two ciphertext including the IV, since this would be too long. Instead, we exploit a certain feature of the CBC MAC, which we call its parsimoniousness." This enables us to drop one block from the pass-two ciphertext and still be able to recover the plaintext. This is the main idea of our construction. There are some technical matters that complicate things; see Section 2 and Figure 1 .
Our approach can be instantiated in many further ways; it actually encompasses many modes of operation. We describe VIL mode in terms of two specialized-tools: what we call a parsimonious" pseudorandom function PRF and a parsimonious" encryption scheme. Both of these tools can be constructed from block ciphers, and we show a few ways to do this. Thinking of VIL mode in these general terms not only provides versatility in instantiation, but, equally important, our proof of correctness is made much simpler by the added generality: what is irrelevant is out of sight, and what is relevant can besingled out and separately proved, in part by invoking known results 4, 21, 3 .
Related work. There is a quite a lot of work on constructing block ciphers of one blocklength given block ciphers of another blocklength. Luby and Racko 10 consider the question of how t o turn an n-bit to n-bit pseudorandom function PRF into a 2n-bit to 2n-bit block cipher. They show that three rounds of the Feistel construction su ces for this purpose, and that four rounds su ce to obtain a super" PRP from a PRF. The paper has spawned much w ork, with 12, 22, 19, 20, 25 to name a few.
Naor and Reingold 15 provide a construction which extends a block cipher on n-bits to a block cipher on N = 2ni bits, for any desired i 1. A variation on their construction yields a cipher on N = ni bits for any i 1 18 . It is unclear how to use these constructions for arbitrary N meaning not necessarily a multiple of n and across assorted input lengths.
Lucks 11 generalizes Luby-Racko to consider a three round unbalanced Feistel network, using hash functions for round functions. This yields a block cipher on any given length N by starting with a PRF of r bits to`bits and another of`bits to r bits where r +`= N. Of course this requires the availability of the latter primitives for given values of r; .
Anderson and Biham 1 provide two constructions for a block cipher BEAR and LION which use a hash function and a stream cipher. This too is an unbalanced Feistel network.
Some ciphers which are intended to operate on blocks of various lengths have been constructed from scratch. The CMEA attacked by 24 is an example.
A forward-then-backwards" mode of operation is described in 8 , under the names Triple-DES Key Wrap" and RC2 Key Wrap." While not length-preserving, a length-preserving variant is possible, and it might beagoodcipher across messages of assorted lengths. See Section 5 for further discussion.
We h a v e already mentioned Rivest's strongly non-separable" encryption 23 and that variableinput-length enciphering provides one mechanism to achieve that goal.
The VIL mode of operation was invented in 1994 when the authors were at IBM 2 . No security analysis was provided at that time.
VIL Mode Example
In this section we describe one particular instantiation of VIL mode enciphering. For concreteness, let us start from DES, a map DES : f0; 1g 56 f 0 ; 1 g n ! f 0 ; 1 g n where n = 64. Using this map we construct the function F : f0; 1g 563 f 0 ; 1 g 64 ! f 0 ; 1 g 64 for enciphering strings of length at least 64. Extending to messages of length less than 64 will bediscussed later. Given a key K = K1 k K2 k K3, partitioned into three 56-bit pieces, and given a plaintext M 2 f0; 1g 64 , form the ciphertext C = F K M as depicted in Figure 1 and as speci ed here:
Algorithm F K1 k K2 k K3 M 1 Let M pre x be the rst jMj,nbits of M. Let M su x be the remaining bits. 2 Let pad be a 1" followed by the minimum number of 0" bits such that jMj + jpadj is divisible by 64. 3 Partition M pre x k pad k M su x into 64-bit blocks M 1 M m . 4 Let C 0 = 0 n , and let C i = DES K1 C i,1 M i for all 1 i m.
5 Let = DES K2 C m .
6 Let P be the rst jMj , n bits of DES K3 k DES K3 + 1 k DES K3 + 2 : 7 Let C pre x = P M pre x . 8 Return ciphertext C = k C pre x .
The computation of C can belooked at as having two stages. In the rst stage Steps 1 5 we compute , which is some sort of CBC-MAC of M under the key K1 k K2. In the second stage Steps 6 7 we encrypt M, except for M's last 64 bits, under key K3. We use counter-mode encryption with an initialization vector of . The ciphertext is the MAC together with the encrypted pre x of M.
The MAC is not computed by the basic" CBC-MAC, but some variant of it. Our constraints preclude using the CBC-MAC in its customary form. First we need to be able to properly handle messages of arbitrary length the basic CBC-MAC is only secure on messages of some xed length, this length being a multiple of the blocklength. But in addressing this issue we m ust ensure that given and an jMj , 64 bit pre x of M, we are able to reconstruct the last 64 bits of M. That this can be done can be seen in the following algorithm for computing F ,1 K1 k K 2 k K3 C. As before, C 2 f 0 ; 1 g 64 and K1; K 2 ; K 3 2 f 0 ; 1 g 56 . The existence of the following algorithm demonstrates that F is indeed a cipher.
Algorithm F ,1 K1 k K2 k K3 C 1 Let be the rst 64 bits of C. Let C pre x be the remaining bits.
2 Let P be the rst jC pre x j bits of DES K3 k DES K3 + 1 k DES K3 + 2 : 3 Let M pre x = P C pre x .
4 Let pad be a 1" followed by the minimum number of 0" bits such that jM pre x j + jpadj is divisible by 64. The interesting step is Step 7, where one exploits the structure of this version of the CBC-MAC to compute the last block of plaintext.
We remark that standard methods, like setting Ki = DES K i 1::56 , would allow K1, K2 and K3 to be derived from a single 56-bit key, in which case F would be a map F : f0; 1g 56 f 0 ;1 g 64 !
Figure 1: An example way to realize VIL-mode encipherment. Here we use the block cipher DES.
In this example the message M to encipher is a few bits longer than 64 3 bits. The underlying key is K = K1 k K2 k K3. The ciphertext is C = k C pre x .
f0; 1g 64 . We also remark that that the domain can be extended to all of f0; 1g that is, we can encipher strings of fewer than 64 bits using methods which w e will later discuss. However, these methods have not been proven secure with desirable security bounds. It should be kept in mind that the above example is just one way to instantiate VIL-mode encipherment. Both stages the computation of and the encryption of M pre x can be accomplished in other ways. We n o w m o v e t o w ards these generalizations.
The General Approach
Towards the general description of VIL and its proof of correctness we n o w make some de nitions. Let M be a message space and let`: N ! N be a function. We de ne reference" PRFs RandM; and PermM. A random function RandM; is de ned as follows: for each M 2 M , let M is a random string in f0; 1g` jMj . A random function Perm M is de ned as follows: for each n umberisuch that M contains strings of length i, let i be a random permutation on f0; 1g i , and de ne M = i M where i = jMj.
We de ne security following 6 , adapted to concrete security as in 4 . A distinguisher is a possibly probabilistic algorithm A with access to an oracle. Let A be a distinguisher and let F = fF K j K 2 K g be a PRF with key space K and jF K Mj =`jMj. Then we let Note that it is crucial that we use the full" CBC MAC that is, the MAC is all of C m , not a proper pre x. In 4 it is shown that the CBC MAC is secure whenever E is, in the sense that Parsimonious encryption. A parsimonious encryption scheme is a triple of algorithms S = K; E; D. Algorithm K returns a random element from the key space which we likewise denote K. Encryption algorithm E : K M takes a key K 2 K and M 2 M, chooses a random IV f 0 ; 1 g n , and then encrypts the message M into a ciphertext C = I V k C , where jC j = jMj. The process is denoted C E K M , or C E K M ; IV when we regard IV as an explicitly given input to E. The decryption algorithm has domain K f 0 ; 1 g and, given K 2 K and C 2 f 0 ; 1 g , D K C = M whenever C = E K M; IV for some M 2 M and IV 2 f 0 ; 1 g n .
W e de ne security following 3 . The idea is that an adversary cannot distinguish the encryption of text from the encryption of an equal-length string of garbage. Let S = K ; E ; D be a parsimonious encryption scheme and let A be a distinguisher. Then
In the rst experiment the oracle, given M, returns a random encryption of M under K, while in the second experiment it returns a random encryption of a random string of length jMj. De ne Adv priv S t; q; to be max A fAdv priv S Ag where the maximum is over all adversaries who run in time at most t and ask at most q oracle queries, these totaling at most bits.
Examples. Common methods of symmetric encryption using a block cipher are parsimonious. For example, CBC-mode encryption with a random IV is parsimonious. Its domain is M = f 0 ; 1 g n + ,
where n is the blocklength of the underlying block cipher. The domain for CBC-mode encryption is easily enlarged to M = f0; 1g ; for example, if the last block" M m of plaintext has length less than the blocklength n then encrypt it as C m = E K C m,1 1::jM m j M m . Alternatively, counter-mode encryption with a random initial counter is parsimonious and has domain f0; 1g .
This was the choice for Stage 2 in our example scheme of Section 2. The security of CBC-mode and counter-mode encryption are established in 3 .
VIL: General scheme. We are now ready to give the general description of VIL mode. Let M 0 be a message space, let n 1 b e a n umber, and let M = M 0 f0; 1g n strings n-bits longer than strings in M. Let G : K prf M!f 0 ;1 g n be a parsimonious PRF, and let Recover : K enc M 0 f 0 ;1 g n ! f 0 ;1 g n be its associated recovery algorithm. 
Analysis
The following theorem says that F as constructed above is a secure variable-input-length cipher, as long as both G and S are secure. Proof. Let A be an adversary attacking F, and let t be its running time, q the number of queries it makes, and the total length of all its queries put together. We assume without loss of generality that A never repeats an oracle query. This is important to some of the claims made below. We consider various probabilities related to running A under various di erent experiments: The second subclaim, that r , p 5 q 2 =2 n+1 , is of course clear; the statistical distance between a family of functions and a family of permutations is given by the collision probability underueries.
So consider the rst subclaim, namely p 4 ,r q 2 =2 n+1 . This is true because the encryption scheme is parsimonious. The IV is chosen at random, and for each xed IV, the map E Kenc pre x ; I V i s a permutation on M. Thus, p 4 , r is the statistical distance between a family of permutations on M and a family of random functions on M, which is again q 2 =2 n+1 because all strings in M have length at least n. K , for a random K 2 K , from a pair of oracles ; , 1 , for a random permutation . This question has been investigated by Bleichenbacher and Desai, who point out that our VIL construction is not a super variable-input-length cipher, and they propose a construction for such a cipher 5 .
We have focussed on the case in which the message length is at least the blocklength n of the underlying block cipher. For shorter messages of even length 2`one can proceed as follows. First map the underlying enciphering key K into subkeys K enc ; K prf ; K 1 ; K 2 ; : : : ; K using standard key-separation techniques. Now when jMj n , proceed according to VIL mode, using keys K enc and K prf . But when jMj n encipher M using an r-round Feistel network, keying the blockcipher-derived round function by K jMj=2 . We point out that while such an approach may work well in practice, the bounds one gets following 10 and its follow-on work will bevery weak for our purposes, since these bounds degrade as the blocklength shrinks and we are here imagining a blocklength of just a few bits. Thus enciphering very short messages in a provably-good way remains open.
When this paper was presented at FSE '99, Mike Matyas described an alternative construction to encipher a message M: rst, CBC-encrypt M with zero IV to get a ciphertext N; and then, to generate the ciphertext C, CBC-encrypt N, but starting from the its last black and working back towards the rst block. A similar scheme is given in 8 . Ciphertext stealing can be used to handle inputs of length not a multiple of the blocklength. This sort of forward-then-backwards" CBC sounds like an elegant approach, and it would be interesting to know if some version of it can be proven secure.
